
Kava Lend’s exploit has exposed how a nearly empty BUSD market let an attacker inflate collateral roughly 243,000 times and borrow 55.2 million KAVA, worth $3.76 million before the attack.
Summary
- A dormant BUSD market allowed the attacker to inflate collateral and borrow the pool’s available KAVA.
- Immunefi’s security chief says small on-chain transactions suggest the attacker rehearsed the method before execution.
- Accounting bugs caused 56 hacks and $247 million in losses through Oct. 21, according to Immunefi.
Immunefi’s head of security, Gonçalo Magalhães, told crypto.news that the attacker deliberately pushed the BUSD market into an unusual accounting state before draining the lending pool.
The exploit targeted a market that remained active long after its stablecoin had fallen out of regular use. In The Block’s reporting, the borrowed tokens carried a pre-attack value of $3.76 million, while sales on BNB Chain brought in roughly $2.1 million.
Kava Lend’s BUSD market was reduced to dust
According to Magalhães, the attacker first repaid every outstanding loan in the BUSD market and became its only participant. The next step left its net supply at two hundred-millionths of a dollar, an amount commonly described as dust.
With so little supply in the calculation, the protocol’s interest accounting multiplied the attacker’s BUSD position approximately 243,000 times. The inflated position then served as collateral for borrowing the available KAVA.
“The attack was planned and carefully executed,” he said.
A Bitquery investigation described two wallets working together through 127 borrowing rounds in 98 minutes. One wallet supplied BUSD collateral, while another withdrew the underlying BUSD before the resulting loan was liquidated.
In Bitquery’s reconstruction, the liquidation process closed the loan despite finding almost no BUSD to seize. Clearing the debt reopened borrowing capacity, allowing the wallets to repeat the process.
The researchers calculated that the wallets retained 53.9 million KAVA after repaying other borrowers’ loans. Their reconstruction distinguished the total borrowed from the amount kept after those repayments.
Small transactions preceded the attack
Magalhães pointed to small deposits, loans and withdrawals made in the BUSD market before the exploit. He described three days of such activity as evidence suggesting that the attacker had rehearsed the method publicly on-chain.
“The attack itself then took less than two hours,” he said.
His explanation focused on conditions that ordinary activity might not expose. A lending market could function normally with healthy liquidity, he said, yet become vulnerable when almost nothing remained.
“When markets and operations are healthy, the protocol works as designed. In unusual conditions, the same protocol can suddenly become vulnerable. Hackers thrive in unusual conditions.”
For this market, he identified two possible protections: pausing operations when liquidity fell below a safe level, or adding code checks that prevented interest factors from growing so dramatically.
BUSD issuance ended in 2023
The stablecoin’s retreat began years earlier. In February 2023, Paxos announced it would stop minting BUSD following direction from the New York Department of Financial Services.
Paxos’s announcement set Feb. 21, 2023, as the effective date and said existing Paxos-issued tokens remained backed by segregated dollar-denominated reserves.
Binance subsequently outlined plans to phase out BUSD support, including removing trading pairs and restricting its use as fresh margin collateral.
Kava’s response, quoted by The Block, described the incident as isolated to Kava Lend and said it was “not an infinite mint.” The team said it had paused the Axelar bridge as a precaution, although the report traced the attacker’s bridged KAVA through LayerZero.
Immunefi urges checks on inactive markets
Simone Imbrescia, Immunefi’s vice president of engineering, product and design, described the exploit as a familiar lending-protocol problem: a market holding almost nothing can assign deposits an inflated value that borrowers then use as collateral.
He said accounting bugs of this kind were behind 56 hacks and $247 million in losses in Immunefi’s 2026 breakdown through Oct. 21.
An October UNCX accounting exploit involved a different mechanism, with withdrawal and cancellation functions leaving share counters inconsistent. Magalhães said the resulting calculations inflated the value assigned to remaining positions.
Imbrescia recommended keeping locked liquidity in each market, pausing borrowing in inactive markets, and limiting how quickly a deposit’s recorded value could change.
“Quiet, older markets are easy to overlook, so it’s worth keeping them in audit and bug bounty scope too,” Imbrescia said.

